
Why State and Local Agencies Get Hit
Ransomware crews are businesses. They look for targets where intrusion is cheap and the odds of getting paid are good, and state and local government fits that profile for reasons that have little to do with carelessness.
First, the technology is old. Many agencies run applications and operating systems that vendors no longer support, sometimes because a replacement has been stuck in procurement for years. Every unsupported system is a door with a broken lock that anyone on the internet can find.
Second, the teams are small. A county IT department might have five people supporting thousands of users across courts, public safety, health, and schools. Security is one hat among many, and nobody is watching the alerts at 2 a.m.
Third, downtime is political. When tax payments, permit systems, or 911 dispatch go dark, leaders face pressure to restore services fast, and that pressure can push an organization toward paying. Attackers know it. They read the same local news coverage you do.
Finally, agencies are connected. Vendors, regional partners, and state networks all hold trusted credentials into agency systems, and intruders increasingly come in through those side doors rather than the front.
The scale of the damage is public record. Baltimore spent more than $18 million recovering from its 2019 ransomware attack, most of it on rebuilding systems rather than the ransom, which came in under $100,000. A county agency in the DMV asked us to review its backups after a near miss last year, and the review found the nightly jobs had been failing silently since a storage migration. Nobody had tested a restore. That gap, not a lack of effort, is what ransomware finds.
How the Attacks Get In
Across our incident work in the DMV, successful attacks against government targets usually start in one of five ways. The table below shows each entry point, what it looks like in practice, and the first fix we recommend.
| Entry point | What it looks like | First fix |
|---|---|---|
| Exposed remote access | VPNs, remote desktop gateways, and management tools reachable from the open internet, often installed by a vendor and forgotten | Inventory them, patch or replace them, and require MFA to reach them |
| Stolen credentials | Passwords reused from other breaches, or phished from staff, then tried against email and VPN logins | MFA on every account, starting with email and administrators |
| Unpatched software | Known vulnerabilities on public CISA exploit lists, left open for months | A patch process that puts internet-facing systems on a 14-day clock |
| Phishing and payment fraud | Messages that harvest logins or redirect vendor payments | Email authentication (SPF, DKIM, DMARC), a one-click report button, and MFA |
| Vendor compromise | Trusted suppliers whose credentials or connections get hijacked | Limit vendor access to what is needed, monitor it, and put it in the contract |
Most intrusions chain two of these together. A typical sequence runs: credentials harvested by phishing, used to reach an unpatched VPN appliance, then used to find and delete the backups. Break any link and the attack stalls. That is good news for small teams, because you don't have to fix everything at once to change your odds.
Seven Defenses That Move the Needle
When we compare agencies that stopped an attack with agencies that didn't, the difference is rarely exotic tooling. It's a short list of controls, done completely:
- Multi-factor authentication on every account, starting with email and administrators. MFA blocks most credential-based attacks on its own. Use phishing-resistant methods, meaning security keys or passkeys, for privileged accounts, because attackers have learned to phish codes sent by text.
- Backups that are offline and tested. Ransomware crews delete every backup they can reach before they encrypt anything. Keep at least one copy no network account can touch, and test a full restore at least quarterly. An untested backup is a hope, not a control.
- Patch internet-facing systems first. Work from CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. Anything exposed to the internet goes on a 14-day deadline, while internal systems can follow a calmer monthly cycle.
- Endpoint detection that someone actually watches. Detection tools belong on every endpoint and server, but a tool only matters if a human responds to its alerts. For small teams, a monitoring service closes the overnight gap.
- Separate admin accounts from daily work. One standard account for email and browsing, a second account for administration, and no shared local admin passwords. This habit alone keeps a phished clerk from becoming a domain administrator.
- Segment the network. Courts, public safety, payments, and industrial controls should sit in separate zones with controlled paths between them. Flat networks turn one compromised laptop into everything.
- Rehearse the response. Two tabletop exercises a year, one with elected or agency leadership in the room. Keep a current contact list, an insurance policy someone has actually read, and an incident response arrangement signed before the bad day, because mid-incident is the wrong time to negotiate a contract.
Paying for It: SLCGP and Free Federal Help
Most of the list above costs less than a single incident, but "less than a breach" can still be more than a municipal budget. That's where the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program (SLCGP) comes in.
SLCGP provided $1 billion over four years beginning in fiscal 2022, funded through the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law and administered by FEMA with support from CISA. States apply through their State Administrative Agency and must pass most of the money, at least 80 percent, through to local and rural jurisdictions. A successor program authorized in late 2024 continues annual funding on the same model.
Eligible costs line up well with the defenses above: security planning, risk assessments, MFA and endpoint detection deployments, training, exercises, and hiring support. If you're at a local agency, the practical first step is finding your state's cybersecurity point of contact and reading the state plan, because projects that map to plan priorities win. If you're at a state agency, the pass-through requirement makes local demand your ally, so build the project pipeline early.
Grant money isn't the only free help. CISA offers no-cost vulnerability scanning and assessments to public entities. The Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) provides threat intelligence and incident coordination to state, local, tribal, and territorial governments. And any government body can move its email to a verified .gov domain at no cost, which takes one common impersonation trick off the table.
What This Means for You
If you run IT or security for a public agency in DC, Maryland, or Virginia, the honest summary is this: you are a target because of your constraints, not your failures, and the controls that change your odds are known, fundable, and finite.
Start by seeing your footprint the way an attacker does. Our external penetration testing work maps your internet-facing exposure before someone else maps it for you. Build a roadmap that matches grant priorities so SLCGP funding can carry the cost, which is where our compliance advisory team helps. And make sure that when prevention fails, you have practiced people to call: our 24/7 incident response team works with state and local agencies across the DMV, and the agencies that recover in days rather than months are the ones that made that call before the bad day.