# The Federal Zero Trust Checklist: What OMB M-22-09 Actually Requires

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OMB M-22-09 is the federal zero trust strategy issued in January 2022, and it requires federal agencies to meet specific goals across five pillars by the end of fiscal year 2024: identity, devices, networks, applications, and data. The headline requirements are phishing-resistant multifactor authentication for every user including contractors, a complete asset inventory, encrypted DNS and HTTP traffic, single sign-on for every application, and automated data categorization. Progress is measured against the CISA Zero Trust Maturity Model. The deadline has passed, but most agencies are still working toward Advanced maturity, and the requirements still drive federal security work today.

I lead security strategy at Fantasy Cybersec Inc., and I spent the years before that as a CISO at a DMV fintech and as fractional CISO to more than 20 mid-market companies. I've turned M-22-09 into board-ready roadmaps enough times to know which requirements eat calendars. This checklist is that experience, pillar by pillar, in the order we sequence the work.

## What Is M-22-09, in Plain Terms?

M-22-09 was issued on January 26, 2022, carrying out the zero trust direction in Executive Order 14028 from May 2021. It is not a framework. It is a strategy with dated, verifiable goals, and it tells every federal agency to name a zero trust lead, stand up an implementation team, and report progress through the FISMA process.

The measuring stick is the CISA Zero Trust Maturity Model. Version 2 of the model keeps the same five pillars as the memo, adds three cross-cutting capabilities that apply everywhere (visibility and analytics, automation and orchestration, governance), and grades each pillar across four maturity stages:

| Stage | What it looks like, using identity as the example |
| --- | --- |
| Traditional | On-premises directory, passwords alone, a VPN that grants broad network access |
| Initial | MFA on some applications, cloud identity partially adopted |
| Advanced | Phishing-resistant MFA everywhere, one central identity provider, conditional access |
| Optimal | Continuous, risk-based authentication decisions informed by analytics |

M-22-09 asked agencies to reach specific goals by the end of fiscal year 2024 and uses the Advanced stage as the yardstick. Most agencies we work with sit between Initial and Advanced today, with identity furthest along and data furthest behind. **That gap is normal, and it is also the roadmap: work the pillars in the order below.**

## The Identity Checklist

Identity is where M-22-09 is most specific, because credentials remain the most common way into federal systems. The requirements:

- Deploy phishing-resistant multifactor authentication for every user, including contractors. PIV cards and FIDO2 keys count. SMS codes do not, because they can be relayed and phished.
- Centralize identity management: one identity provider, with applications federated to it, so you can see and control every account from one place.
- Protect account recovery as hard as login. A phishing-resistant front door with a help-desk back door is not phishing-resistant.
- Separate and time-limit privileged access. Administrators get dedicated accounts, reviewed on a schedule.

What Advanced looks like: one identity provider, conditional access rules that weigh device health and location, and no SMS-based factors anywhere in the enterprise. The most common gap we find isn't the MFA rollout. It's the contractor population that never got enrolled.

## The Device Checklist

You cannot apply zero trust rules to a device you cannot see, so the memo starts with inventory:

- Maintain a complete, continuously updated asset inventory. If a laptop can connect to agency resources without appearing in an inventory, the inventory is incomplete.
- Check device health before granting access. A device should prove it is managed, patched, and running endpoint protection before it reaches anything sensitive.
- Deploy endpoint detection and response across the fleet, with logs feeding a central location.
- Block or strictly constrain unmanaged devices. Guest access is a policy decision, not an accident of configuration.

What Advanced looks like: access decisions that include the device as a signal, not just the user. The most common gap: inventories that cover corporate-issued hardware and miss the personal phones touching email and chat.

## The Network Checklist

M-22-09 treats the network as hostile by default. Location on the agency network grants nothing:

- Encrypt DNS requests and enforce HTTPS across the enterprise. The memo names these explicitly, and CISA and GSA run programs to help.
- Encrypt traffic end to end, including email in transit.
- Replace flat VPN access with application-aware access: a proxy or zero trust network access broker that connects a user to one application, never to a network segment.
- Micro-segment internally. Design as if an attacker already holds a laptop inside the perimeter.
- Align with TIC 3.0, which evaluates trust by risk rather than by network location.

What Advanced looks like: default-deny internal traffic with explicit allow rules per application. The most common gap: the VPN that still grants a full network segment to anyone who authenticates, which is exactly the pattern zero trust exists to remove.

## The Application Checklist

Applications are where users meet the data, and the memo pushes three things: visibility, consolidation, and vendor accountability.

- Inventory every application, internal and internet-facing, with a named owner for each.
- Make every application available through single sign-on against the central identity provider. An application with its own local password store is both a user complaint and an audit finding.
- Test internet-facing applications continuously, not just at launch.
- Put zero trust questions in procurement. The memo directs agencies to ask software vendors about their own zero trust practices before buying.
- Treat email as the application it is: encrypt it in transit and enforce sender authentication so spoofed senders bounce.

What Advanced looks like: no application outside the identity provider, and vendor security answers collected before contract award rather than after the first incident. The most common gap: the inventory that lists the top 20 applications and calls itself complete while the long tail of departmental tools goes untracked.

## The Data Checklist

Data is the pillar furthest behind in most of the assessments we run, and the memo is blunt about it:

- Categorize data automatically. Manual classification dies within a quarter; the memo asks for automation.
- Maintain an enterprise data inventory with owners, not just locations.
- Encrypt sensitive data at rest and in transit as the default, not as an exception.
- Start deploying enterprise data loss prevention, tuned to your categories.
- Apply least privilege to data access, with access reviews on a schedule you actually keep.

What Advanced looks like: categories applied at creation, protections inherited from the category, and sharing controls that follow the data outside the agency. The most common gap: a data inventory that exists as a spreadsheet nobody has updated since the last audit.

## What This Means for You

If you run security for a federal agency or a contractor supporting one, sequence the work: identity first, because every other pillar depends on it; devices and networks next; then applications and data, which take the longest. Measure honestly against the CISA model and report the stage you're at, not the stage you're aiming at. A regional federal contractor we advised reached Advanced identity maturity in under a year by sequencing multifactor authentication and single sign-on before touching network architecture, and it cut its phishing-related security tickets by more than half in the process.

You don't have to build the roadmap alone. Our [zero trust architecture services](https://fancyber.newo.click/services/security-strategy-vciso/zero-trust-architecture/) run maturity assessments against the CISA model and phased implementation roadmaps aligned to M-22-09, our broader [security strategy and vCISO](https://fancyber.newo.click/services/security-strategy-vciso/) practice covers the program leadership, and our [FISMA and NIST RMF support](https://fancyber.newo.click/services/compliance-advisory/fisma-rmf/) practice connects zero trust work to your authorization boundary. If you need the visibility and analytics the cross-cutting capabilities demand, our [managed detection and response](https://fancyber.newo.click/services/managed-security/managed-detection-response/) team runs that monitoring around the clock. Start with the maturity assessment, and when you're ready, [talk to an advisor](https://fancyber.newo.click/contact/).


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*Published 2026-10-08. Source: https://fancyber.newo.click/insights/federal-zero-trust-checklist/ — Fantasy Cybersec Inc., 1900 K Street NW, Suite 800, Washington, DC 20006, +1-202-555-0135.*
